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ABSTRACT 
ZACHARY A. WILKINS: A Study of the Comprehension of Tautologies in Adults and 
Children. 
(Under the direction of Bruno Estigarribia) 
 
The main objective of this paper is to examine the interpretation of so-called 
“equative tautologies” in adults and children. An experiment designed to assess the 
capacity of adults and children ages 7-9 to calculate implicature from tautologies is 
discussed. The prediction of the “Radical Semantic” account of tautologies (Wierzbicka 
1987, Gibbs & McCarrell 1990) that human referent tautologies (e.g. “a plumber is a 
plumber”) are easier to interpret than concrete referent tautologies (e.g. “a snack is a 
snack”) was not confirmed by data from 23 adult subjects. Furthermore, the child data 
suggest that children do not interpret tautologies in an adult-like way. When presented 
with tautological statements, 7-year-olds tended to rely on their own preferences and 
knowledge of others’ preferences rather than computing a conversational implicature as 
adults do, but this tendency decreased with age. Several explanations are provided to 
explain the poor performance of children compared to adults in the experiment, with 
suggestions for future work on the comprehension of tautologies. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The main objective of this paper is to examine the interpretation of so-called 
“equative tautologies” in adults and children. An experiment designed to assess the 
capacity of adults and children ages 7-9 to calculate an implicature from tautologies is 
discussed. The prediction of the “Radical Semantic” account of tautologies (Wierzbicka 
1987, Gibbs & McCarrell 1990) that human referent tautologies (e.g. “a plumber is a 
plumber”) are easier to interpret than concrete referent tautologies (e.g. “a snack is a 
snack”) was not confirmed by data from 23 adult subjects. The child data suggest that 
children do not interpret tautologies as adults do. When presented with tautological 
statements, 7-year-olds tended to rely on their own preferences and knowledge of others’ 
preferences rather than computing the conversational implicature that adults do, but this 
tendency decreases as the children approach age 10. 
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Chapter 2: Equative Tautologies in Adults 
 
Section 2.1: Tautologies and Implicature  
Tautologies are statements that are true in every possible world. This truth is 
independent of evidence from the real world; the form of the tautology itself makes the 
statement necessarily true. For example, the statement in (1): 
(1) Either you go or you don’t go. 
The statement in (1) cannot be false—regardless of whether the hearer goes or doesn’t 
go, the statement holds. (1) does not provide falsifiable information about the world. 
Thus, whatever meaning the utterance has must be inferred in some way. 
Equative tautologies1 in particular are utterances that exhibit the form "x is x" (e.g. 
"water is water") where x is some NP (or DP). As with all tautologies, equatives are 
semantically uninformative in that they are necessarily true in all possible worlds. 
Regardless of the actual real-world properties of referent of chair (whether there are 
many or only one, whether they are large or small, etc.), it is always true to say that a 
chair’s a chair. 
In his seminal work Logic and Conversation, Grice (1975) coined the term 
“implicature” to describe meaning that is implied rather than being explicitly stated, and 
more specifically “conversational implicature” to indicate an inference that the hearer is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Equative	  tautologies	  are	  sometimes	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  “nominal	  tautologies”	  (Okamoto	  1991,	  Gibbs	  
&	  McCarrell	  1990)	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compelled to make, assuming the speaker is obeying the cooperative principle. He 
identified two types of conversational implicature, generalized conversational implicature 
and particularized conversational implicature (Grice 1975). 
Generalized conversational implicatures are implicatures associated with a 
particular form that persist throughout a variety of contexts, while particularized 
conversational implicatures are highly dependent on a specific context to be licensed. The 
difference between these two types of implicature is illustrated in the example below. 
(2) A: Is it time to call everyone for dinner? 
 B: I burned some of the pizza. 
 IMPLICATURE1: It is not yet time to call everyone in for dinner. 
 IMPLICATURE2: Not all of the pizza is burned. 
In the particular context of A’s utterance, B’s utterance generates IMPLICATURE1. 
However, the form “I burned some of the pizza” does not carry the implicature “It is not 
yet time to call everyone for dinner” in other contexts. This is because IMPLICATURE1 
is a particularized conversational implicature. The implicature is licensed only in the 
context of the preceding utterance. On the other hand, IMPLICATURE2 is not 
specifically licensed by this context. The lexical item some generates the conversational 
implicature not all across a variety of contexts. 
Grice considered tautologies extreme examples of a flouting of the maxim of 
Quantity (1975: 33). Upon hearing a tautology, a hearer knows that since the speaker is 
being cooperative in conversation, he or she knows to make all conversational 
contributions as informative as is required by the context. Thus, the hearer knows that if 
the speaker wished to convey more information with the utterance, he or she would have 
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done so. The hearer must reason through the tautology and attempt to extract the meaning 
that the speaker intended. 
However, Grice does not provide explicit predictions how implicature is 
generated by a tautology in context. Rather, according to Grice, the hearer’s 
interpretation hinges upon her or her ability to explain a particular tautology in its context 
(Grice 1975: 33). In other words, he advocates for no uniform interpretation of 
tautologies, relegating their meaning to the context in which they were uttered.  
Since Grice’s (1975) first characterization of them, tautological statements have 
been the subject of intense debate in the pragmatics literature, with several proposals 
attempting to capture their meaning. The neo-Gricean approach (Ward & Hirschberg 
1991) has expanded how the maxim of Quantity (as well as the maxim of Relation) 
applies to the case of tautologies by claiming that tautologies are commonly used to 
identify a class of referents (to the exclusion of other classes). Discarding the need for 
universal pragmatic maxims, the “radical semantic” account Wierzbicka (1987) of 
tautologies has proposed a different means of interpreting them.  
 
Section 2.2: The Neo-Gricean Account of Tautologies 
 Neo-Griceans (Levinson 1983, Ward & Hirschberg 1991) claim that hearers 
interpret tautologies in a similar way across contexts, and thus tautologies are said to 
produce generalized conversational implicatures, such as the one in (4) below. 
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(3) A: My husband really wants me to buy a Toyota and my mother really wants me 
to buy a Ford… 
B: A car’s a car. 
(4) IMPLICATURE: Speaker B regards individual differences between cars as irrelevant. 
Ward & Hirschberg (1991) have expanded the Gricean program to delineate 
explicitly how the maxims of Quantity and Relation apply to (equative) tautologies in 
order to generate the implicature in (4) from the context in (3). The authors state that 
when a speaker S utters an equative tautology (as in the example a car’s is a car in (1)) 
the hearer H may reason as follows: 
¤ S has affirmed a tautological utterance of the form ‘a is a’, which appears to add 
nothing to our mutual beliefs in general, and, in particular, nothing to our mutual 
beliefs about ‘a’.  
¤ Assuming that S is observing the Cooperative Principle, then, by the maxims of 
Quantity and Relation, S has said as much as s/he truthfully can about ‘a’. 
¤ S might have produced utterances of a similar form, say ‘a is b’, which could have 
added something to our mutual beliefs about ‘a’. 
¤ S chose not to utter such alternatives. 
¤ Thus S implicates that these alternatives are not relevant for the purposes of the 
exchange. 
(Ward & Hirschberg 1991: 511) 
That is, divergence from some prototype of “a” mutually salient to both interlocutors 
should be disregarded for the purposes of the conversation. Say then, for example, that 
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the prototype of a bird is an animal that features feathers and has the ability to fly. 
Consider this in light of the following example: 
(5) A: You said you were taking me to the zoo to show me some pretty birds, but all I 
see are these penguins that sit around and don’t fly. 
B: A bird is a bird. 
In the example above, Speaker B indicates with the tautology that divergence from a 
prototype, i.e., individual differences within the class of all birds, are not relevant for the 
purpose of the exchange.  
The crux of Ward & Hirschberg’s (1991) expansion of the Gricean (1975) 
approach to tautologies is the exclusion of alternatives. Ward & Hirschberg noted one 
expansion of this idea in that within certain contexts, speakers use tautologies to 
communicate to the hearer the importance of boundaries between two given sets. For 
example, Speaker B in (5) seeks to communicate that membership or non-membership of 
an animal in the class of all birds is unambiguous; Speaker A is expected to draw upon 
the common knowledge that a penguin is, in fact, a bird. This particular use of equative 
tautologies was noted by Ward & Hirschberg as “a denial that… a distinction between 
particular members of the class denoted is relevant” (Ward & Hirschberg 1991: 511). 
However, Ward & Hirschberg (1991) were not the only researchers to note this 
common use of equative tautologies. For Bulhof & Gimbel (2004), when a given 
predicate denotes a “vague set” (that is, it denotes a set with some internal variation) a 
tautology can be used to disregard that internal variation within that set. Gibbs & 
McCarrell (1990) termed this use of tautologies “token indifference,” but did not explore 
in detail how this interpretation might be applied more globally, nor did they provide 
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examples. The authors simply recognized that the meaning expressed by equative 
tautologies in this context is  “that any one instance of a concept is equivalent to any 
other” (Gibbs & McCarrell 1990: 129). 
Whether it is referred to as (in)distinction of class members (Ward & Hirschberg 
1991), a “vague set” (Bulhog & Gimbel 2004) or “token indifference” (Gibbs & 
McCarrell 1990), this particular use of equative tautologies constitutes an important one, 
worth investigating. However, while noted in the literature, this feature of tautologies has 
yet to be tested experimentally to corroborate informal observations; it remains to be seen 
if, in fact, speakers employ this understanding of tautologies in a diversity of contexts. 
This particular use of tautology will be the subject of much analysis in the experiment 
presented in this paper, but first it is essential to discuss an alternative approach to 
tautologies.  
 
Section 2.3: The “Radical Semantic” Account of Tautologies 
 The primary alternative to a neo-Gricean approach has its origins in Wierzbicka’s 
(1987) self-described “radical semantic” account of tautologies.2 Wierzbicka’s (1987) 
central claim about tautologies, for which Gibbs & McCarrell (1990) sought to offer 
empirical evidence, is that in order to interpret otherwise uninformative tautologies, 
hearers infer specific propositions that are dependent upon utterance-internal factors, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Wierbicka	  (1987)	  explains	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “semantic”	  for	  her	  approach	  as	  follows:	  “According	  
to	  Levinson	  ([1983]),	  among	  others,	  a	  sentence	  like	  boys	  are	  boys	   is	  NECESSARILY	  true.	  I	  dispute	  
the	  validity	  of	  this	  statement,	  which	  reflects	  a	  mistaken	  belief	  that	  the	  sentence	  under	  discussion	  is	  
factual.	  It	   is	  clearly	  not:	   it	  expresses	  a	  certain	  attitude,	  and	  attitudes	  can	  hardly	  be	  called	   'true'	  or	  
'false'.”	  (Wierzbicka	  1987:	  99)	  Wierzbicka	  has	  chosen	  the	  word	  “semantic”	  in	  light	  of	  the	  importance	  
she	  attributes	  to	  the	  semantic	  properties	  of	  a	  given	  NP/DP	  “x”.	  For	  an	  approach	  that	  treats	  phrases	  
such	  as	  the	  one	  in	  (1b)	  such	  that	  the	  second	  NP	  is	  predicative,	  see	  Autenrieth	  (1997)	  and	  Meibauer	  
(2008).	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such as the type of referent in the NP of the tautology (i.e. abstract, human, or concrete) 
and the syntax of the tautology (i.e. singular or plural, the presence or absence of an 
article). Wierzbicka (1987) divides the class of equative tautological utterances into three 
subclasses based on their form. Each is interpreted as conveying some kind of speaker 
attitude: 
A. A ‘sober attitude towards complex human activities’ is expressed by the syntactic 
formula Nabstract is Nabstract (e.g. ‘war is war’) 
B. ‘Tolerance for human nature’ is associated with the rule Nhum.plural are Nhum.plural 
(e.g. ‘boys are boys’) 
C. ‘Obligations’ and ‘rules of human behavior’ map to the form (Art) N is (Art) N. 
(e.g. ‘the law’s the law’) 
(Wierzbicka 1987: 105-107) 
In this way, Wierzbicka argues that universal pragmatic principles are unnecessary for 
the interpretations of tautologies. Rather, she suggests that specific propositions are 
somehow generated via a hearer’s recognition of the type of referent used in the 
tautology. That is, specific tautologies have conventionalized meanings depending on the 
semantics of the noun. 
Gibbs and McCarrell (1990) conducted an experiment on adults, in which they 
sought to provide evidence for Wierzbicka’s claim by showing that the interpretation of 
tautology depends on the type of the NP in a given equative tautology (i.e. whether the 
referent is abstract vs. concrete vs. human, and whether the tautology is plural or singular 
and has or lacks a determiner). In their first experimental study, they tested the effect of 
syntactic variation and referent type on 36 UC-Santa Cruz freshmen’s understanding of 
	  
	  
	   	  9	  
tautologies. TGibbs & McCarrell varied the tautological utterances in this first 
experiment in both the syntax and the type of referent. They split their tokens into six 
groups: two groups varied by noun type (“human/abstract/concrete inanimate”), two 
groups varied by “modality” (x will be x / x is x) and two groups varied by number (x is x 
/ x’s are x’s).  
In their first experiment, tautologies were presented in isolation to the subjects, 
who were asked to evaluate each utterance without context. The goal was to ascertain the 
subjects’ perceived “attitudes towards” and “acceptability of” certain noun phrase 
tautologies. Subjects ranked the tautologies that appeared on-screen from 1 to 7 for two 
measures: “highly unacceptable to highly acceptable” and affectively “very positive to 
very negative.” Gibbs & McCarrell’s (1990) results from the first experiment suggest that 
speakers interpret most easily: human or abstract nouns over concrete inanimate (e.g. 
“business is business” > “a flower is a flower”) nouns and “non-modal” syntactic 
structures over “modal” constructions (e.g. “kids are kids” > “teachers will be teachers”). 
In addition, their affectivity results suggested that certain phrases (e.g. “boys will be 
boys”) have context-independent negative charge. For the authors, this is evidence that 
each tautology has a token-specific meaning as well as token-specific affective charge, 
and they interpret this as confirmation that there is no systematic mechanism responsible 
for proper interpretation of tautologies.3 However, as I will discuss in greater detail 
below, in recording the judgments of their subjects the authors did not consider the 
frequency of each tautology, which could potentially influence both their “affective 
charge” and “acceptability.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Gibbs	  &	  McCarrell	  (1990)	  provide	  no	  qualitative	  information	  about	  subjects’	  interpretation	  of	  
tautologies	  in	  their	  experiment;	  they	  provide	  only	  quantitative	  data	  on	  “acceptability”	  and	  
“affectivity”.	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The second experiment incorporates context into the interpretation of tautology, 
providing either a positive or negative context in order to encourage positive or negative 
readings of the tautology. For example, for the tautology “Boys will be boys”, 
participants were presented with one of two scenarios: “Boys give such trouble…” or 
“Boys give such joy…”. The result of the procedure yielded a preference similar to that 
of Experiment 1 wherein human and abstract nouns were more easily processed than 
concrete inanimate nouns. In the discussion of Experiment 2, Gibbs & McCarrell (1990) 
note that some tautologies (e.g. “a telephone is a telephone”) showed considerable 
contextual sensitivity. However, these authors do not consider that the potential impact of 
participants’ previous exposure to tautologies that have become conventionalized (e.g. “a 
promise is a promise”) may cause those tautologies to be less contextually sensitive than 
non-conventionalized tautologies (e.g. “a telephone is a telephone”). 
With respect to the affectivity ratings (i.e. “positive” or “negative”) of certain 
tautologies, Gibbs & McCarrell (1990) posit that some referent types being more 
positively regarded than others as evidence that stereotypical information facilitates 
interpretation of tautologies. A stronger reaction to a tautology may be an accurate 
measure of a stronger stereotype associated with a particular class of referents. However, 
negative charge for a given tautology did not seem to be a good indicator of acceptability 
of the tautology in Gibbs & McCarrell’s experiment. For example, the mean affectivity 
ratings for each referent type in their first experiment (human = 4.11, abstract = 3.75, 
concrete = 4.14) did not map predictably onto the mean acceptability ratings (human = 
4.99, abstract = 4.62, concrete = 3.84). In other words, even though abstract noun 
tautologies were regarded most negatively, human noun tautologies were the easiest to 
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interpret. As will be discussed in the following section, other predictors such as high or 
low conventionalization in speech of tautologies may explain this discrepancy.  
Furthermore, Gibbs & McCarrell’s (1990) results do not necessarily provide 
evidence of context independence; a positive response may in fact be a reflection of the 
speaker’s personal feelings regarding the class of all referents denoted by a particular NP. 
For example, if we observe a more positive affectivity rating for “A plumber is a 
plumber” than for “A doctor is a doctor”, the result may in fact provide more insight 
about speakers’ views on plumbers and doctors rather than speakers’ views on tautologies 
in general. 
In addition, Wierzbicka (1987) claims that tautologies are not interpreted 
uniformly by speakers cross-linguistically, but, rather, have language- and token-specific 
meanings. For example, she notes the fact that the tautology “Boys will be boys” in 
English is incomprehensible in French: 
(6) #Les garçons sont les garçons.4 
Wierzbicka (1987) uses the fact that this and other such tautologies cannot be easily 
translated as evidence that a universal pragmatic approach is untenable.  
Wierzbicka and other proponents of the “radical semantic” approach have 
received criticism in the literature for using the non-translatability of certain tautologies 
as evidence that their interpretation does not require any universal pragmatic principles. 
As Ward & Hirschberg note, the lack of translatability of tautologies is no stronger a 
claim than to say that any literal translation should maintain other components of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  “#Les	   garçons	   sont	   les	   garçons”	   is	   the	   original	   translation	   used	   by	  Wierzbicka	   (1987),	   and	   this	  
precise	  translation	  has	  subsequently	  been	  repeated	  by	  those	  who	  have	  criticized	  her,	  such	  as	  Ward	  
&	  Hirschberg	  (1991)	  and	  Bulhof	  &	  Gimbel	   (2004),	  even	  though	  “Des	  garçons	  sont	  des	  garçons”	  or	  
“Un	  garçon	  est	  un	  garçon"	  may	  be	  more	  plausible	  options.	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utterance meaning (Ward & Hirschberg 1991: 509). For example, that fact that a 
language does not possess determiners comparable to English a and the is not an 
indication that the language does not possess the capacity for scalar implicature 
exemplified by the English Horn scale < a, the >. 
In spite of the flaws in her argument mentioned above and pointed out in the 
literature (cf. Fraser 1988, Bulhof & Gimble 2004, Meibauer 2008, inter alia), 
Wierzbicka’s (1987) and Gibbs & McCarrell’s (1990) approach sheds light on a very 
revealing aspect of the tautology debate that has seemed to elude researchers on both 
sides. This aspect is that, in fact, some tautologies have become conventionalized in 
speech and do not need to be calculated. The pragmatic approach as well has been 
encumbered by a preoccupation with attempting to explain certain highly familiar 
tautologies, such as war is war (Levinson 1983) or business is business (Meibauer 2008), 
which appear to carry meaning that has become conventionalized in speech by frequent 
use that is difficult to project on to equivalent tautologies in other languages. I will argue 
that this is an important component to a discussion on all equative tautologies, though, 
and I propose a way to think about these conventionalized tautologies in light of the 
(seemingly) infinite number of nonce tautologies. 
 
Section 2.4: Conventionalized/Short-Circuited Tautologies 
 I argue in this paper that prior to analyzing equative tautologies, one should 
consider sub-dividing all equative tautologies into one of two categories: 
conventionalized and non-conventionalized. This crucial aspect of the class of all 
(equative) tautologies appears to have evaded analysis on both sides of the debate. That 
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is, Wierzbicka’s (1987) observation that not all tautologies are interpreted equally was 
not unfounded. Indeed, certain tautologies (war is war, business is business, a promise is 
a promise) have become so commonplace in speech that pragmatic principles are no 
longer needed for their interpretation. In other words, the meaning has become stored in 
the lexicon and the implicature is not calculated in the conversational exchange.  
 The conventionalization of certain tautologies can be thought of in terms of 
“short-circuited” implicature (Morgan 1978). That is, certain implicatures, such as “Can 
you pass the salt?” have become so conventionalized in speech that they no longer 
require the listener to compute the implicature. Rather, the meaning is readily available 
upon hearing a specific sequence.5 On the other hand, when a speaker is presented with a 
novel tautology, he calls upon Gricean principles in order to recover meaning from an 
otherwise uninformative utterance (Ward & Hirschberg 1991). In the case of “Can you 
pass me the salt?” it would be infelicitous to inquire about the hearer’s ability to pass salt 
when it is obvious to both speakers that he or she possesses the ability to pass the salt. So, 
the hearer infers that the speaker must have intended something other than this request for 
information, namely, that the speaker is requesting that the hearer actually reach and grab 
the salt.  
However, as Morgan (1978) states, this process of reasoning is unnecessary in 
actual speech due to the fact that requests of this type are so common in speech; that is, 
the implicature is “short-circuited”, and the hearer immediately interprets a request upon 
hearing the utterance. By making this key distinction between conventionalized and non-
conventionalized implicature, we can isolate those tautologies for which the implicature 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Whether	  conventionalized	  tautologies	  acquired	  their	  idiomized	  meanings	  historically	  from	  the	  
repeated	  application	  of	  pragmatic	  principles	  is	  not	  a	  claim	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  explore	  in	  this	  paper.	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is not short-circuited. This allows us to isolate tautologies that exploit the maxims of 
Quantity and Relation in a more predictable way.  
The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA, Davies 2008) was used 
to identify those tautologies which, as a result of greater frequency in usage, are more 
likely to have become conventionalized in speech due to short-circuiting. This corpus is a 
compilation of 450 million words from transcripts of spoken language, fiction, 
magazines, newspapers, and academic journals. The corpus will help in determining 
which tautologies have become ‘conventionalized’ from their high frequencies and aid in 
isolating the remainder, which can be labeled as ‘non-conventionalized’. 
This idea of conventionalized implicature vs. non-conventionalized implicature is 
especially enlightening in view of Gibbs & McCarrell’s claims about tautologies. The 
authors state that the type of referent in an equative tautology conditions its 
interpretation. As justification for their looking at the “acceptability” of certain 
tautologies in their experiment, Gibbs & McCarrell (1990) state the following: 
“Phrases such as A hat is a hat or Carrots will be carrots seem less acceptable as 
meaningful tautologies than do phrases such as Business is business or Boys will 
be boys that mention people or activities for which speakers/listeners have strong 
stereotypes.” 
(Gibbs & McCarrell 1990: 129) 
Gibbs and McCarrell assume that the stereotypes associated with “business” and “boys” 
monitors their participants’ interpretation of tautologies. Yet, there is one salient 
alternative for explaining why some of the authors’ referent classes may be more readily 
interpretable than other classes. Gibbs & McCarrell (1990) mix freely tautologies 
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common in American English (≈conventionalized) with those that they seem to have 
coined themselves (≈unconventionalized). This likely has an effect on their participants’ 
responses because it narrows the interpretation of the tautology toward its conventional 
use in speech. At no point do Gibbs & McCarrell address the potential influence of 
frequency in the input on their results. The authors do note that some tautologies such as 
Business is business and Boys will be boys are listed as idioms in some dictionaries, but 
nevertheless argue for the need for a universal account of tautologies that groups 
common tautologies with novel ones. The following table shows the frequency of the 
representative tautologies mentioned above from Gibbs & McCarrell (1990) above in the 
Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA): 
Figure 1: Frequency of Conventionalized vs. Non-Conventionalized Tautologies in 
the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) 
Tautology “A hat is  a hat” 
“Carrots will 
be carrots” 
“Business is 
business” 
“Boys will  
be boys” 
Frequency 
 in COCA 1 0 55 108 
 
(Davies 2008) 
 
The fact that phrases such as Business is business and Boys will be boys are 
clearly more common in everyday speech as evidenced by the corpus suggests that 
respondents may employ memorized knowledge about certain tautologies as a potential 
resource for interpreting these semantically uninformative utterances. This kind of 
association is crucial for Gibbs & McCarell’s (1990) hypothesis that stereotypical 
knowledge is the determining factor in speakers’ interpretation of tautologies. While the 
authors do use some nonce tautologies that are unattested in the Corpus of Contemporary 
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American English (e.g. teachers will be teachers, vacations are vacations), these cases 
represent a small portion of the materials they provide in their appendix. I argue that 
meanings have become conventionally associated with certain frequently used tautology, 
in a way similar to certain idioms that have been identified as “non-compositional” 
(Nunberg, Sag & Wasow 1994), that is, having conventionally acquired a meaning that is 
automatically calculated from memory rather than from context.6  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  As	  Nunberg,	  Sag	  &	  Wasow	  (1994)	  note,	  many	  idioms	  do	  in	  fact	  contain	  some	  level	  of	  semantic	  
compositionality,	  but	  I	  argue	  here	  that	  conventionalized	  tautologies	  are	  highly	  comparable	  to	  their	  
definition	  of	  (truly)	  non-­‐compositional	  idioms.	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Chapter 3: Equative Tautologies and Pragmatic Development in Children 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, it is possible to isolate a generalized 
conversational implicature generated by tautologies in certain contexts, as seen in 
example (5). Namely, this implicature denotes a lack of class-internal distinction (Ward 
& Hirschberg 1991), a “vague set” (Bulhof & Gimbel 2004) or “token indifference” 
(Gibbs & McCarrell 1990). While adults perceive this implicature in conversation7, it 
remains to be seen at what age children begin to use generalized conversational 
implicature to understand these tautologies. Before investigating this question, it is useful 
to examine previous studies of pragmatic knowledge in children to determine when they 
begin to understand other generalized conversational implicatures, such as scalar 
implicature.  
 
Section 3.1: Late Pragmatic Development in Children 
Do children ages 7-9 exhibit pragmatic skills in previous studies on implicature in 
children? What does this suggest for a study on child comprehension of tautologies? As 
Clark & Amaral (2010) have noted, while some studies suggest that certain Gricean 
maxims such as Quality and Relation are used by children as young as 3 or 4, often many 
scalar implicatures (generated by the maxim of Quantity) seem to create difficulty for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Empirical	  support	  for	  this	  claim	  is	  also	  presented	  in	  the	  following	  section.	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children as old as 9 or 10. Recent studies on the pragmatic development of children 
(Noveck 2000, Chierchia et al 2001, Bott & Noveck 2004) suggest that children as old as 
9 do not interpret scalar implicatures in an adult-like way. That is, children tended to 
favor a semantic interpretation rather than an interpretation enriched by recognizing that 
the speaker chose to utter a weaker term when a stronger term is available. For example, 
while adults infer some elephants to mean not all elephants, children infer some 
elephants to mean some and possibly all elephants. As the authors state, this is because 
adults pragmatically restrict the domain of items such as some to exclude all while 
children only interpret the terms semantically. 
Noveck (2000) found that the ability to restrict the domain of “might” to exclude 
“must” increases with age, and by extension the ability to calculate (scalar) implicature 
increases over time. Another study by Noveck & Chevaux (2004) suggests that in fact the 
generalized conversational implicature often associated with and in which conjoining 
propositions are expected to have occurred in temporal succession is not quite grasped in 
children ages 7-10. Similarly, Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, Gualmini & Meroni found in 
their experiment looking at disjunctive or, children “lack the computational resources to 
apply scalar implicatures when a single assertion is presented alone.” (2001: 157). Taken 
in conjunction, these studies seem to suggest that the computation of scalar implicature 
involves an advanced mechanism that is acquired very late in the scheme of language 
acquisition. This computation requires that the child develop a complete understanding of 
how the maxim of Quantity applies in conversation. That is, when a speaker makes a 
conversational contribution that is semantically under-informative, children do not enrich 
the meaning of the utterance pragmatically. Such a lack of comprehension of the maxim 
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of Quantity would cause clear problems for tautologies, which convey no truth-
conditional meaning. 
Other, more recent studies (Papafragou & Tantalou 2004, Musolino 2004, Miller, 
Schmitt, Chang & Munn 2005) have found that by reducing the cognitive burden of the 
experimental paradigm, children may in fact be able to compute scales as young as 4 or 5. 
For the case of tautologies, a similar prediction may be made; an experimental paradigm 
that removes cognitive confounds may provide the earliest possible indication of a child’s 
ability to compute implicature. 
As Noveck & Chevaux (2002) point out, more research is needed on child 
comprehension of other types of implicature. Tautologies present a unique opportunity 
for examining child interpretation of non-scalar Quantity-derived implicature; as pointed 
out by Ward & Hirschberg (1991), tautologies involve both the maxim of Quantity and 
the maxim of Relation and require computation of decidedly non-scalar implicature. 
While both tautologies and scales involve pragmatic enrichment triggered by insufficient 
information (Quantity), tautologies, unlike scales, involve an additional burden of the 
speaker to integrate a semantically uninformative utterance into the discourse (Relation). 
That is, the main difference between implicature calculated in the context of tautologies 
and scalar implicature is that while both involve Quantity, tautologies involve one 
additional pragmatic maxim than scalar implicature, Relation.  
Given the two groups of studies on scalar implicature stated above, two salient 
hypotheses emerge for how children interpret tautologies: on the one hand, children may 
only be able to compute this implicature in the latter part of this age range. On the other, 
children may acquire this skill at a young age, but can only exhibit this skill under 
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conditions that minimize cognitive burden. This study provides a unique opportunity for 
examining whether children interpret non-scalar implicatures in an adult way, and it may 
provide us with a clearer picture of the development of pragmatic competence in 
children. 
 
Section 3.2: Previous Work on Equative Tautologies in Children 
The best-known previous study conducted on child interpretation of tautological 
utterances is that of Osherson & Markman (1975). The authors were primarily interested 
in whether children were capable of evaluating tautologies (as well as contradictions) 
truth-conditionally. That is, are children aware that tautologies are inherently true (and 
contradictions inherently false) by virtue of their linguistic form, rather than evidence?   
The experiment involved the reading of statements regarding the color of an 
object in the experiment’s hands, usually a chip. The experimenter would either hide the 
chip inside his or her hands, or leave it exposed for the child to see. The researcher read 
the 7-year-olds both tautological and contradictory utterances, such as “Either this chip is 
green or it is not green” and “This chip is green and it is not green”, respectively. The 
experimenter then asked the child “Is it true? Is it false? Or can’t you tell?” Children 
experienced considerable difficulty in providing a response to these utterances. The table 
below from Osherson & Markman (1975) summarizes some of the authors’ results. Note 
most importantly the tautologies in items (3) and (4).  
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Figure 2: Data from Osherson & Markman’s (1975) Experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Osherson & Markman 1975: 218) 
 
Ultimately, the authors conclude that children cannot interpret tautologies because of an 
inability to process metalinguistic truth-value, which is independent of tangible, real-
world evidence. That is, they see children’s failure to interpret these tautologies as true or 
false as a result of the fact that the children preferred to look for real-world correlates to 
prove or disprove each utterance, rather than recognizing that it is true or false based on 
the form of the sentence. 
  In the aforementioned results, only a quarter of Osherson & Markman’s 7-year-
olds provided what they deemed the ‘correct’ answer, which is that the statement is 
automatically true since it is a tautology. However, it is difficult to regard Osherson & 
Markman’s as conclusive evidence that children are incapable of calculating 
metalinguistic truth values from tautologies and contradictions, especially without an 
adult control group to verify the ‘correct’ response. Adults may provide “can’t tell” as a 
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response to items (3) and (4) above (deemed incorrect by the experimenters) as the 
children did; it cannot be certain that subjects interpret “can’t tell” as “I can’t tell whether 
the statement is true or false” rather than “I can’t tell what color the chip is”, when the 
chip is hidden from view.  
  Prior to moving on to an experiment on children’s ability to evaluate tautologies 
pragmatically, is it important to consider whether Osherson & Markman’s (1975) 
experiment provides evidence as to whether children interpret tautologies as semantically 
uninformative. However, given the lack of adult control group in the experiment, it is 
unclear if the children did not recognize tautologies as “adding nothing to our mutual 
beliefs about ‘a’” (Ward & Hirschberg 1991) which is necessary prior to calculating 
implicature. Without conclusive data to this respect, it is admittedly an assumption that 
children do in fact recognize the uninformativity of tautologies. The current experiment 
simply addresses children’s ability to compute implicature from contexts with 
tautologies, and does not establish their semantic interpretation of the phrases. 
 
	  
	  
	   	  23	  
 
 
Chapter 4: Experiment 
 
Section 4.1: Motivation 
 The goal of the present experiment is to assess child comprehension of novel 
tautologies, specifically whether children compute implicature from tautologies as adults 
do in a controlled context. While tautologies may be involved in the computation of 
several different implicatures depending on the context, one specific implicature 
computed from tautology will be tested for in this experiment. Equative tautologies 
license the implicature that, when a hearer is given several options from within a salient 
class, “all options are equally relevant” (Ward & Hirschberg 1991). To examine Ward & 
Hirschberg’s theory for actual adult speech, a control group of adults is first assessed, and 
then used to compare with the child group. Since the context in the experiment is 
controlled and limited to one particular type of implicature that can be generated by 
tautologies, the adult group will also provide evidence for or  
against the impact of the of referent x is a given equative tautology x is x, as proposed by 
Wierzbicka (1987). 
 
Section 4.2: Participants 
Sixteen child and twenty-three adult American English-speaking participants completed 
this study. Children were between the ages of 7;0 and 9;6 and adults were age 18 or 
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older. All participants resided in central North Carolina, in the Triangle region of Chapel 
Hill, Durham and Raleigh. Participants were recruited using advertisements throughout 
the Triangle and via in-person recruitment at the Kidzu Children’s Museum in Chapel 
Hill. The target age range of 7-9 years was chosen based on Noveck (2000) and Noveck 
(2001), due to the fact that of their groups of 5-, 7- and 9-year-olds, age 7 appeared to be 
the first point at which children began to exhibit to at least a minimal degree the 
pragmatic ability that Noveck examined. To the right is the actual age distribution of the 
child participant pool. 
 
Figure 3: Child Participants Age in Years/Months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 4.3: Predictions 
The adult group is expected to calculate this implicature at a high frequency. This 
particular implicature is that upon hearing “a is a”, an interlocutor recognizes that class-
 Child 
Years 
Child 
Months 
1 7 0 
2 7 6 
3 7 6 
4 7 8 
5 7 9 
6 7 9 
7 7 9 
8 7 11 
9 7 11 
10 8 0 
11 8 0 
12 8 8 
13 8 10 
14 9 0 
15 9 1 
16 9 6 
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internal differences among all a are not relevant for the purposes of the exchange. That is, 
the prediction is that when a participant is presented with a scenario in which three 
options are presented to a person in the story and that person utters a tautology, he or she 
implies that all three options are equally acceptable. For example, as in the example in 
(1), say we present three different models of cars to an interlocutor: a Toyota, a Honda, 
and a Ford. If, when asked to choose among the three, the interlocutor states “A car’s a 
car”, we infer that she has no preference among the three. All three cars are thought to be 
acceptable. On the other hand, if the 9-year-olds were to be unable to calculate this 
implicature, the children would use other information to make a decision about 
desirability, such as personal preference or knowledge about others’ preferences8. The 
data will also be examined to see if this rate of comprehension increases significantly 
with age (i.e., from age 7 to age 9), which would be an indication of increasing capacity 
to calculate this implicature as the child gets older.  
In addition, another condition was built into the adult group, in which an equal 
number of three different referent types were used: abstract nouns, concrete nouns and 
human nouns. The purpose of this was to examine the neo-Gricean argument that the 
implicature is derived independent of the referent type, whereas the alternate “radical 
semantic” argument predicts that due to the stereotypes commonly associated with 
abstract and human referents, concrete referent tautologies should be more difficult to 
compute (as discussed above). Under the neo-Gricean prediction, all three referent types 
should be comprehended roughly equally. Under the “radical semantic” prediction, 
concrete-referent tautologies (e.g. “a drink is a drink”) should be significantly more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  For	  example,	  a	  participant	  could	  use	  personal	  preference	  to	  respond	  “no”	  to	  bottled	  water	  simply	  
because	  he	  or	  she	  does	  not	  like	  bottled	  water.	  Similarly,	  a	  participant	  could	  use	  knowledge	  of	  other	  
people’s	  preferences	  to	  respond	  “yes”	  to	  soccer	  because	  a	  lot	  of	  boys	  they	  know	  like	  soccer.	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difficult to comprehend than abstract- or human-referent tautologies (e.g. “a sport is a 
sport” / “a plumber is a plumber). 
 
Section 4.4: Methodology 
The participants were presented with a PowerPoint presentation that included 
fifteen slides, each containing an audio recording and three pictures. The pictures always 
included three members of some class (e.g. “a sweet apple, a sour apple and an old apple” 
/ “lemonade, cherry soda, and bottled water”). The participant listened to an audio 
recording of the scenario with one image each of the three options. 
Five slides were of the tautology condition (e.g. “an apple is an apple” / “a color 
is a color”). Five slides were of a condition which I will call Control A, in which the 
interlocutor expresses some preference about certain members of the class (e.g. “I want 
an apple that tastes good” / “I want a color that’s good for a baby girl”). Finally, five 
slides were of a condition I will call Control B, in which the interlocutor states 
indifference towards individual class differences (e.g. “Any of those apples sounds good” 
/ “I think all of those colors look good”). These three groups were alternated randomly 
throughout the presentation, with the limitation that the PowerPoint never begin with a 
tautology. Find in Figure 4 a representative example of these stimuli (see Appendix 2 for 
all 15 stimuli). 
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Figure 4: Example of Visual Stimulus 
 
The participant was then asked three yes-or-no questions about each of the three 
options given what the character in the story said. In order to avoid conditioning the 
responses for or against ‘yes-to-all’ responses, no practice trials were provided to the 
participant. For example, “Do you think John would eat the sweet apple? (Yes/No) Do 
you think John would eat the sour apple? (Yes/No) Do you think John would eat the old 
apple? (Yes/No)”. Context will be provided for novel tautologies such that a flouting of 
the maxims of Quantity and Relation provides a straightforward interpretation mirroring 
that outlined by Ward & Hirschberg (1991). That is, upon hearing a tautology x is x, 
participants are predicted to accept all items that are considered to be within the category 
of all x’s. Uniformity in participant interpretation of the tautologies will be taken as 
evidence that speakers are indeed making predictable decisions based on pragmatic skills. 
The prediction for this portion of the study is that indeed children begin to possess the 
kind of pragmatic reasoning necessary to felicitously interpret tautologies within this age 
range. 
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Figure 5: Transcript of Audio Stimulus Example 
 
Section 4.5: Responses 
 Responses were coded in a binary fashion in which successes were given a value 
of 1 and failures were given a value of 0. Success was calculated differently for the 
Control A, Control B and Tautology conditions. See for example one of the fifteen 
scenarios below, for which a participant heard one of three responses from John: a 
tautology, an explicit preference, or explicit indifference. 
i. Control A:  
• Interlocutor expresses an explicit preference (e.g. “I don’t want anything sweet.”) 
• Success = Detected Stated Preference  (e.g. no to cherry soda, yes to bottled water)  
ii. Control B:  
• Interlocutor expresses explicit indifference (e.g. “I’m thirsty, so I’ll take any of them.”) 
• Success = Yes to All 
iii. Tautology:  
• Interlocutor states a tautology (e.g. “A drink’s a drink.”) 
• Success = Yes to All 
	  
	  
	   	  29	  
In this way, the participant was believed to have comprehended Control A if he or she 
replied “yes” to one specific target option and “no” to another specific target option. The 
participant was believed to have comprehended Control B if he or she replied “yes” to all 
three. Similarly, the participant was believed to have comprehended the Tautology 
condition if he or she replied “yes” to all three. 
 
Section 4.6: Results/Discussion – Quantitative Analysis 
As seen in the table below, adults had a very high rate of success in calculating 
the target implicature when hearing the tautology.  
Figure 8: Adult Tautology Success Rate Across Referent Type 
Tautology type Successes Out of (n=) Comprehension Rate 
Abstract noun 37 40 92.5 
Human noun 32 40 80.0 
Concrete noun 36 40 90.0 
All Tautologies 105 120 87.5 
 
Furthermore, the prediction made by Wierzbicka (1987) and colleagues that, due to 
salient stereotypes, abstract- and human-noun tautologies should be significantly easier to 
compute does not seem to bear out in this data. In fact, human nouns seem to be the most 
difficult of the three, though much more data is needed to reject the null hypothesis that 
the three values are significantly different. 
Now let us compare the success rates of adults and children to see if child 
treatment of tautologies diverges from adult treatment of tautologies. As seen in the table 
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below, children were largely unable to compute the appropriate implicature that was 
licensed from the tautology. A chi-squared test was performed on these values, and this 
difference was found to be highly significant, x2 (1, N = 200) = 30.16, p < .0001. 
Figure 9: Overall Tautology Success Rates – Adults and Children 
Group Successes Out of (n=): Comprehension Rate 
Children 18 80 22.5 
Adults 105 120 87.5 
 
Furthermore, the children did increase their ability to interpret the tautology with age 
significantly x2 (1, N = 80) = 5.94, p = 0.042. This ability can be observed in the 
following plot9:  
 
 
Figure 10: Tautology Condition Success Rate Across Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Also,	  see	  qualitative	  responses	  in	  the	  section	  below	  regarding	  one	  outlier	  child.	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The line draws the approximate mean probability of success at a given age, with exact 
values given below. While ability to compute the implicature was very significantly 
lower than that of adults, some children closer to age 10 did indeed begin to show an 
ability to compute the implicature.10 Nevertheless, as seen in the graph, there is a still a 
great deal of variation in the children near age 9. Less than a third of all child participants 
were older than age 8, so more data from 9-year-olds is needed to provide further support 
for this conclusion. 
The question then becomes: why did the children fail to compute the implicature 
when the adults did? There may be many possible reasons, but one plausible answer 
might be that children use their personal preferences and knowledge of others’ 
preferences rather than using information from the tautology in the scenario. This will be 
further explored in the next section where qualitative responses are discussed. In addition, 
those kids that were more likely to use their own preferences on the tautology conditions 
were also more likely to do so on the Control B condition (explicit indifference). The 
correlation coefficient between these two conditions was .732 (p =.0013).  
Figure 11: Control B Success Rate Across Age 
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That is, some children (especially those closer in age to 7) relied on personal preference 
and knowledge of others’ preferences in both the Control B condition and the tautology 
condition.  
Given this data, one may be inclined to assume that children employed their own 
opinions and knowledge of others’ opinions across all conditions, with no regard to the 
dialogue. However, this pattern did not hold for Control A (explicit stated preference): 
Figure 11: Summary of Child Success Rates for All Three Conditions 
Condition Successes Out of (n=): Comprehension Rate 
Tautology 18 80 22.5 
Control A 69 80 86.3 
Control B 22 80 27.5 
 
 As seen above, while children were overall unsuccessful on the Tautology and Control B 
conditions, they were generally successful on the Control A condition. Important to note 
in the measurement of success on Control A is that the child was required to detect a 
specific preference from the dialogue (e.g. “I don’t want anything too sweet” and “I want 
a toy that I can play with outside”). This is relevant for the conclusion because it tells us 
that children were indeed able to detect preferences in the dialogue. However, in the 
absence of clear preferences for one or two options in the Tautology and Control B 
conditions, the children drew on other information, especially personal preference or 
knowledge of other people’s preferences, to accept only one (or two) of the options 
presented. As such, the children were much more capable of detecting a character’s 
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explicit preference in the story (e.g. “I want a strong plumber”, “I don’t want anything 
sweet”) than detecting indifference towards all three options. One reason for this may be 
that younger children hesitate to accept all three options, and as a result if the story does 
not provide them a means of excluding at least one of the three, the children then proceed 
to employ their own opinions or knowledge of others’ opinions to exclude one or more 
options.  
 
Section 4.7: Results/Discussion – Qualitative Analysis 
Upon completing the experiment with each child, the experimenter proceeded to 
ask specific questions to investigate the child’s motivations behind any non-target 
responses on the tautology condition. The goal was to see how children were making 
decisions when they failed to compute the “token indifference” implicature from the 
tautology. These responses have been organized chiefly into three categories: “Type 1” in 
which the child used individual preference or personal experience to inform decisions; 
“Type 2” in which the child invoked knowledge of other people’s preferences to respond 
“yes” to certain options to the exclusion of others; and “Type 3” in which the child 
seemed to reject one referent on the basis that it did not belong in the greater category 
stated. These three response types are organized in the tables below. Children were also 
asked about what they think specific tautologies mean, and these responses are 
summarized as well. 
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Figure 12: Child Qualitative Response Type 1 
Type 1: Used individual preference or personal experience to inform decisions 
Age Explanation Given for Non-Target Response 
7;0 A cat is a cat: “I said no to the Siamese cat because it’s not so cute.” 
7;6 A chore is a chore: “I picked taking out the trash because it’s easy.” 
7;8 A vacation is a vacation: “I’ve been to the beach before.” 
7;9 A sport is a sport: “I picked soccer because I like it.” 
7;9 A vacation is a vacation: “I think Grandma’s house would be really special.” 
8;0 A sport is a sport:  
Why did you say no to volleyball? “I was just thinkin’ about what I wanted.” 
9;1 A snack is a snack: “I said no to celery because it’s not sweet.” 
 
Figure 13: Child Qualitative Response Type 2 
Type 2: Invoked knowledge of other people’s preferences to assume interlocutor 
preference  
Age Explanation Given for Non-Target Response 
7;6 A snack is a snack: “I picked celery because it’s healthier.” 
7;6 A chore is a chore: “I said no to trash because trash might be stinky.” 
7;9 A drink is a drink: “I said no to cherry soda because it’s bad for you.” 
7;11 A superhero is a superhero:  
“I picked Spider Man because a bunch of kids like him.” 
8;0 A drink is a drink: “I don’t think he should have soda after a [soccer] game.” 
8;8 A toy is a toy: “I said no to the stuffed animal because it’s babyish.” 
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9;1 A sport is a sport: “I said no to volleyball because volleyball is for girls.” 
 
Figure 14: Child Qualitative Response Type 3 
Type 3: Rejected referent(s) not perceived as belonging to tautology category 
Age Explanation Given for Non-Target Response 
7;11 A vacation is a vacation: "[Going to grandma's house] isn't a vacation." 
8;0 A superhero is a superhero:  
“I said no because I’ve never heard of Orange Man before.” 
9;1 A toy is a toy: “I said no to the stuffed animal because it isn’t playful.” 
 
The prevalence of Type 1 and Type 2 across different children seems to indicate 
that these were the two primary strategies that kids employed to guide their decision-
making. This information supports the claim from the quantitative analysis above that 
children used personal preference or knowledge of other people’s preferences, in the 
absence of a clear preference provided by the dialogue. Category membership of all three 
referents is a necessary prerequisite to felicitously generating the implicature of interest 
in this experiment, and Type 3 seemed to show that some children did not draw the same 
mental category boundaries as suggested in the dialogue. With only three instances, this 
mismatching seems to be perhaps a product of this experiment and not an indication of 
global strategies children were using to guide their responses in the experiment.  
Furthermore, subjects were asked about what they thought phrases like A plumber 
is a plumber and A color is a color mean. Most children, especially the 7-year-olds, did 
not offer informative responses to these questions. However, three children provided 
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interesting responses. One child (age 7;11) offered variable information about the 
meaning of tautologies. When first asked what the speaker in the dialogue meant when he 
said A superhero is a superhero, he responded “he wants a powerful superhero”, but 
when asked about A plumber is a plumber, he stated “that means he’ll take all of them,” 
offering clear rationale for the “yes” answers he had provided for all three. Furthermore, 
the only child to receive a perfect score on the tautologies (age 9;0) explained in the 
experimental follow-up that “A plumber is a plumber means he doesn't care even if the 
plumbers are different." This child also received perfect scores on Control A and Control 
B (as seen in the figure in the previous section). 
 Perhaps most interestingly, the only nine-year-old of the three to receive a zero on 
the comprehension task offered indications that he was in fact capable of computing 
implicature from tautologies. Despite the fact that he responded “yes” only to the color 
“green” (among green, blue and pink) after the experiment the child (age 9;1) stated "A 
color is a color means it doesn't matter which one." When pressed about A drink is a 
drink, he gave a similar response, stating that all three drinks were okay, even though he 
had said “no” to cherry soda during the experiment. When asked why this may have 
been, he responded, “Oh, I guess I forgot.” This anecdote seems to indicate that children 
near age 9 were capable of calculating the same implicature from tautologies as adults, 
but used other information to make decisions in the experiment. With more data, this may 
provide support for the trend found in the previous section of proficiency increasing with 
age across children.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 Based on the data gathered in the experiment presented in this paper, two 
conclusions can be drawn. First, the prediction of the “Radical Semantic” account of 
tautologies (Wierzbicka 1987, Gibbs & McCarrell 1990) that human referent tautologies 
(e.g. “a plumber is a plumber”) are easier to interpret than concrete referent tautologies 
(e.g. “a snack is a snack”) was not confirmed by data from 23 adult subjects. While Gibbs 
& McCarrell (1990) had a higher number of subjects (36) in their study, the fact that the 
opposite trend was observed in the current 23 subjects lends support to a “Radical 
Pragmatic” account of tautologies (Ward & Hirschberg 1991), whereby referent type is 
not a significant factor in the interpretation of tautologies by adults. The difference 
between Gibbs & McCarrell’s (1990) result and the result of the current study may be 
explained by the fact that the current experiment carefully controlled for 
conventionalization of tautologies (e.g. “business is business”). Only tautologies 
infrequent or absent in a corpus of American English (Davies 2008) were included, while 
Gibbs & McCarrell mixed these two sub-types indiscriminately in their stimuli. Second, 
adults performed significantly better than children in providing target responses to 
tautological utterances. Several reasons may be attributed for the higher performance of 
adults in the experiment, which will be discussed in the following section. 
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Section 5.1: Why did adults understand tautologies better than children? 
 While adults succeeded, children at age 7 failed to comprehend tautologies 
presented in context. This result is consistent with the original predictions of the 
experiment based on data on child interpretation of scalar implicature (Noveck 2000, 
Chierchia et al 2001, Bott & Noveck 2004). That is, that children ages 7-9 do not yet 
have a complete understanding of the maxim of Quantity, necessary for interpreting both 
tautologies and scalars. However, is it clear that children failed to behave like adults due 
to a pragmatic failure, or could the result be attributed to some other experimental 
confound or cognitive burden? 
 The data presented in the previous section suggest that rather than using context 
(i.e., the tautology) in forming their responses to questions in the experiment, children 
drew on other strategies to inform their responses, such as personal preference or 
knowledge of others’ preference. This experimental confound prevents one from reaching 
the conclusion that children ages 7-9 lack the pragmatic competence that adults possess.  
Furthermore, additional research must be conducted in order to conclusively 
establish whether children recognize the fact tautologies such as x is x are inherently 
uninformative, which is a necessary step that must come before calculating the 
implicature (Ward & Hirschberg 1987). The question was raised by Osherson & 
Markman (1975) but must be tested more carefully in the future with an adult control 
group to determine whether children in fact recognize tautologies as uninformative 
statements.   
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Section 5.2: Future Studies 
A revised study that successfully averts interference of extralinguistic information 
in the computation of implicature is needed. Such a study will determine whether the 
reason for children’s low success rate in comprehending tautologies is a product of their 
failure to compute an implicature. A paradigm that prevents the child from selecting 
based on personal preference would first begin with a meticulously designed priming 
phase. In this phase, children would be presented with scenarios in which the interlocutor 
either (a) expresses a preference the child likely shares (e.g. “sweet apple”), (b) expresses 
a preference the child likely does not share (e.g. “old apple”), or (c) expresses an 
indifference towards all three options, even if one of these options is undesirable.  
Upon receiving each response, the experimenter needs to provide the child with 
explicit feedback as to whether there response was “correct” or “incorrect”. This phase 
will condition the child to pay close attention to the dialogue as the sole guiding source of 
information for their responses. Children are then discouraged from using information, 
such as personal preference, in making their selections. These steps should provide 
additional protection against the confounds reported in this paper’s experiment. 
Such an experiment should also include an additional adult control group that 
helps determine more conclusively whether children recognize tautologies as 
semantically uninformative. This portion of the study would be similar of Osherson & 
Markman’s (1975) approach, asking adults (in addition to children) whether tautologies 
(or contradictions, etc) are “true” or “false”, as the authors did with children. The adult 
group is necessary to ensure that Osherson & Markman’s result is a confusion observed 
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only in children. Careful piloting would be needed to ensure that this method is usable 
with children.  
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APPENDIX 1 – RAW CHILD DATA 
Child 1 Group 1 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
 
Age 7;11 A-T-B Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
apple N Y N drink N N Y toy Y Y Y 
 
cat N N Y snack Y Y N time out Y Y N 
 
vacation Y Y N color N Y N sport Y Y Y 
 
superhero Y Y Y chore Y N N babysitter Y Y Y 
 
plumber Y Y Y teacher Y N N waiter Y Y Y 
             
Child 2 Group 2 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 7;9 A-B-T Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
snack Y Y Y apple N Y N toy N Y N 
 
color N Y N cat Y N N time out N Y N 
 
chore Y N N vacation Y Y N sport N N Y 
 
teacher Y N Y superhero Y N N babysitter Y Y N 
 
drink Y N Y plumber N Y N waiter Y Y Y 
             
Child 3 Group 3 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 7;0 B-T-A Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
cat Y N Y time out N Y N snack N Y N 
 
sport Y N N vacation Y N N color N N Y 
 
superhero N Y N babysitter N Y N chore Y N N 
 
waiter N Y N plumber N Y N teacher Y N N 
 
drink Y N N toy N N Y apple N Y Y 
             
Child 4 Group 1 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 8;8 A-T-B Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
apple N Y N drink N N Y toy N Y Y 
 
cat N Y Y snack Y Y N time out Y N N 
 
vacation N Y Y color Y N Y sport N Y Y 
 
superhero N Y N chore Y N Y babysitter N N N 
 
plumber Y Y Y teacher N N Y waiter Y N Y 
             
Child 5 Group 2 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 7;6 A-B-T Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
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snack N N Y apple N Y N toy N N Y 
 
color N Y N cat Y N N time out N Y N 
 
chore Y N N vacation Y N N sport N Y N 
 
teacher Y N N superhero N Y N babysitter N Y N 
 
drink Y N N plumber N Y N waiter Y N N 
             
             
Child 6 Group 3 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 7;6 B-T-A Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
cat Y N N time out Y N N snack Y Y Y 
 
sport Y Y Y vacation Y Y Y color Y Y Y 
 
superhero Y Y Y babysitter N Y N chore N Y Y 
 
waiter N N Y plumber N Y N teacher Y N Y 
 
drink N Y N toy N Y Y apple N Y N 
             
Child 7 Group 1 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 7;11 A-T-B Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
apple N Y N drink N N Y toy N Y N 
 
cat Y Y N snack N N Y time out N Y N 
 
vacation Y Y Y color N Y N sport Y Y N 
 
superhero Y Y Y chore Y Y N babysitter Y Y N 
 
plumber Y Y Y teacher Y Y Y waiter Y N Y 
             
Child 8 Group 2 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 9;1 A-B-T Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
snack Y Y N apple N Y N toy N Y Y 
 
color Y N N cat Y N N time out Y N N 
 
chore Y Y N vacation Y Y N sport N Y Y 
 
teacher Y N Y superhero Y Y N babysitter Y Y N 
 
drink Y N Y plumber N Y N waiter Y N Y 
             
             
Child 9 Group 3 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 8;0 B-T-A Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
cat Y N N time out Y N N snack N Y N 
 
sport N Y Y vacation Y Y N color Y Y Y 
 
superhero Y Y N babysitter Y Y N chore N Y N 
 
waiter Y N Y plumber N Y N teacher Y N Y 
 
drink Y N Y toy N Y N apple N Y Y 
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Child 10 Group 5 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 7;9 B-A-T Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
sport N Y N snack N Y N apple N Y N 
 
toy N N Y color N Y N cat Y Y N 
 
babysitter N Y N superhero Y Y N vacation Y Y Y 
 
plumber Y Y Y timeout Y N N teacher Y Y Y 
 
chore N N Y drink N N Y waiter Y Y Y 
             
Child 11 Group 5 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 7;9 B-A-T Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
sport N N Y snack Y Y N apple N Y N 
 
toy N Y Y color N Y N cat Y N N 
 
babysitter Y Y N superhero Y Y N vacation Y N Y 
 
plumber N Y N timeout Y N N teacher Y N Y 
 
chore N Y N drink N N Y waiter Y N Y 
             
Child 12 Group 5 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 8;10 B-A-T Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
sport N Y N snack Y N N apple N Y N 
 
toy N Y Y color N Y N cat Y Y N 
 
babysitter N Y N superhero Y Y N vacation Y Y Y 
 
plumber N Y N timeout Y Y N teacher Y N Y 
 
chore Y N Y drink N N Y waiter Y N N 
             
             
Child 13 Group 4 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 9;6 B-A-T Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
sport Y Y Y snack Y Y Y apple N Y Y 
 
toy Y Y Y color N Y N cat Y Y Y 
 
babysitter Y Y N superhero Y Y N vacation Y Y Y 
 
timeout Y Y Y plumber N Y N teacher Y N Y 
 
chore Y N N drink N N Y waiter Y Y Y 
             
             
Child 14 Group 4 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 7;8 B-A-T Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
sport N N Y snack Y N Y apple N Y N 
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toy Y N Y color N Y N cat Y N N 
 
babysitter N Y N superhero N Y N vacation Y N N 
 
timeout Y N N plumber N Y N teacher Y N N 
 
chore N N Y drink N N Y waiter N N Y 
             
             
             
Child 15 Group 1 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 9;0 A-T-B Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
apple Y Y Y drink N N Y toy Y Y Y 
 
cat Y Y Y snack Y Y N time out Y Y Y 
 
vacation Y Y Y color N Y N sport Y Y Y 
 
superhero Y Y Y chore Y N N babysitter Y Y Y 
 
plumber Y Y Y teacher Y N N waiter Y Y Y 
             
             
Child 16 Group 1 (tautology) 
 
(preference) 
 
(no preference) 
Age 8;0 A-T-B Tautology 
 
Control A 
 
Control B 
  
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
op1 op2 op3 
 
apple N Y N drink N N Y toy Y Y Y 
 
cat Y Y N snack Y Y Y time out Y Y Y 
 
vacation Y Y Y color N Y N sport N Y Y 
 
superhero Y N N chore Y N N babysitter Y Y N 
 
plumber N Y Y teacher Y N N waiter Y N N 
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APPENDIX 2 – STIMULI 
 
1. “A drink is a drink” 
 
 
 
2. “An apple is an apple” 
 
 
 
3. “A toy is a toy” 
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4.  “A snack is a snack” 
 
 
5. “A cat is a cat” 
 
 
 
6. “A time out is a time out” 
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7. “A color is a color” 
 
 
 
8. “A vacation is a vacation” 
 
 
 
9. “A sport is a sport” 
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10. “A chore is a chore” 
 
 
 
11. “A superhero is a superhero” 
 
 
 
12. “A babysitter is a babysitter” 
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13. “A teacher is a teacher” 
 
 
 
14. “A plumber is a plumber” 
 
 
 
15. “A waiter is a waiter” 
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